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In this essay we put into question the pre-occupation with consensus and convergence 
that seems to characterize the field of OMT (Organization and Management Theory).  
Much effort has been directed to providing a model of unification legitimating the 
political containment of conflictual diversity.  Even potentially controversial debates 
(such as the ‘Paradigm Wars’) have taken on a rather tired quality as academics tend to 
look for the ‘middle ground’ or are happy to retreat into private language games.  We 
suggest that we should move beyond ‘bridging’ or ‘containment’ strategies and strive for 
a true re-politicization of the field.  This presupposes that we learn to value notions of 
conflict and struggle again, rather than muffling them by referring to a common 
‘professionalism’. In developing our argument we connect with the thinking of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, offering a challenge to both integration/ consensus and fragmentation/ 
incommensurability discourses which seem so prevalent in our field today. 
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Questioning Consensus, Cultivating Conflict 
To set us on our way, three epigraphs: 
OMT seems to be having a hiccup about the legitimacy of the scientific method and knowledge. 
Instead of building scientific knowledge that better approximates reality, we are building more and 
more paradigms without a means for reconciling them. (Van de Ven, 1999, p.119) 
 
The diversity of organizational theory and the range of ideas about how to develop organizational 
theory increased dramatically during the [past] decade... There has been vigorous and unresolved 
debate about whether such diversity is healthy for the field. There is far more consensus, however, 
that more integration of these varied ideas would help move the field forward.  (Elsbach, Sutton & 
Whetten, 1999, p.627, editorial of an AMR special issue on theory development, emphasis added) 
 
I take it that these are the most important questions which we confront. How to deal with and fend 
off the simplicities implicit in a world in which: ‘Have theory, will travel’ makes for easy 
intellectual and political progress. How to resist the singularities so commonly performed in the 
acts of naming and knowing. How to defy the overwhelming pressures on academic production to 
render knowing simple, transparent, singular, formulaic. How to resist the pressure to enact, yet 
again, the God-trick1. (Law, 1999, p.11) 
 
Introduction  
These epigraphs, expressing contradictory concerns, seem to resonate with the 
professional reality of all of us organizational scholars in recent years.  What exactly are 
we trying to achieve when we conduct fieldwork, write academic articles, act as 
consultants, or teach students?  Many organizational scholars will admit to pangs of 
anxiety when addressing some (or all) of these once innocent sounding questions.  We 
see this anxiety manifesting itself in various, interrelating ways.  These include the 
increasingly problematic relation between academics and practitioners, the proliferation 
of ontological and epistemological positions, and the pre-occupation with relations and 
practices within the community of researchers.   
 
                                                 
1 The ‘god trick’ was defined by Jacques (1992, p.594) as “the invisible power of seeing everything without 
the corresponding responsibility to acknowledge the social/cultural/historical site from which one is 
viewing.”   
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The knowledge-practice antinomy, while lamented for many years, became especially 
pertinent from the early 1990s onwards. As it appeared increasingly obvious that the 
body of knowledge published in academic journals had practically no audience in 
business or government (Daft & Lewin, 1990), the number of special forums and journal 
editions devoted to the topic of research relevance and utilization increased significantly 
(Rynes, Bartunek & Daft, 2001; British Journal of Management – special edition, 2001), 
and the gap between academics and practitioners became a prominent topic in Academy 
of Management presidential addresses (Hambrick, 1994; Huff, 2000; Mowday, 1997).  
The encounter with a body of writing rooted in the distinctive preoccupations and 
manners of proceeding of Continental European philosophy, initially under the labels of 
postmodernism or post-structuralism (Chia, 1996, Kilduff & Mehra, 1997; Parker, 1992), 
started to affect (some would argue ‘infect’) the field of organization studies from the 
early 1990s onwards, making the settled view of “building scientific knowledge that 
better approximates reality” (Van de Ven, 1999, p.119) look increasingly suspect. The 
collision between ideas derived from a not always well understood cluster of 
philosophical traditions and a field largely dominated by an Anglo-Saxon tradition of 
conducting organizational theorizing and research precipitated an ‘inward’ turn of the 
field. Suddenly it became legitimate to make the craft of researching and theorizing more 
explicit (Clegg & Hardy, 1996; Weick, 1999), putting some question marks behind the 
nature and purpose of the field of organization studies/science2.  The ‘paradigm wars’ and 
the ‘Mode 1 versus Mode 2’ debates became particular focus points, centering on the 
nature of management research and the relation between researchers and practitioners 
respectively.  In the following sections we will explore these particular discourses and 
will argue that they make for far too easy intellectual and political progress anno 2004. 
                                                 
2 It is perhaps significant that we do not even agree on a common name for our field, the terms organization 
studies, organization and management theory (OMT), and organization science being used interchangeably 
and depending on researchers’ geographical location. 
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The nature and purpose of research: Paradigm wars or a search for consensus? 
 Given the relative recency of this internal focus and the unexpected turbulence, one is tempted to 
say of the ‘paradigm wars,’ ‘Give war a chance.’ We seem to be in the midst of an active 
shakeout. (Weick, 1999, p.797) 
 
Pfeffer (1993) is generally credited with re-igniting the debate over the proper direction 
of the organization science discipline in the United States. His argument typifies the self-
reappraisal of management research that has marked the 1990s, including pointed 
discussions on the desirable direction of theory building and the true nature of 
management research (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Daft & Lewin, 1990; Sutton & Staw, 
1995; Weick, 1999).  Pfeffer’s (1993) position was unequivocal:  
Consensus itself, however achieved, is a vital component for the advancement of knowledge in a 
field.  Without some minimal level of consensus about research questions and methods, fields can 
scarcely expect to produce knowledge in a cumulative, developmental process (p.611).   
Van Maanen’s animated response3 to this position led Van de Ven (1999), in an ironic 
turn, to sketch the American version of the paradigm wars as a ‘Pfefferdigm’ versus 
‘VanMaanendom’.   
 
It is probably fair to pinpoint Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979) as a starting point for a serious discussion about ‘paradigms’ in 
our field in Europe.  In a reflective essay Burrell (1996) suggested that the key 
contribution of the book was to raise awareness that the normal state of organization 
science is pluralistic:  
This does not mean that organizational analysis is ‘immature’ or is awaiting its normal science 
phase with bated breath. It is simply that a plurality of legitimate and competing perspectives is to 
be expected in all sciences but especially in the social ones (p.648). 
He further argued that organization science, although it shows more of a “fractured 
visage” than it did thirty years ago, has never been a stranger to fractured lines of 
analysis.  It is just that the powerful agreed to ignore fundamental problems in addressing 
                                                 
3 “I want to suggest here that this [Pfeffer's] sour view of our field is – to be gentle – insufferably smug; 
pious and orthodox; philosophically indefensible; extraordinarily naive as to how science actually works; 
theoretically foolish, vain and autocratic; and – still being gentle – reflective of a most out-of-date and 
discredited father-knows-best version of knowledge, rhetoric and the role theory plays in the life of any 
intellectual community.” (Van Maanen, 1995, p. 133)  
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fundamental issues.  The pervasive desire to give OMT an effective presence as a 
discipline meant that scientific legitimacy became identified with academic respectability 
and political neutrality and innocuousness4.    
 
Whilst functionalism is no longer seen as representative of a normal science in our 
discipline, there still seems to exist a strong, if implicit, yearning among scholars that it 
will be replaced eventually and inevitably by another single approach after the period of 
‘revolution’ we are going through. Indeed, if we were living through a true paradigm 
‘war’ (or even a contest), it very much looks as if a mild form of  ‘Pfefferdigm’ (reducing 
the purport of the field’s internal disunity) is winning out in most theoretical discussions. 
Hardy (2002, p.17) talks about an “obsession with consensus and convergence that 
characterizes much of the work carried out by the Academy of Management” in this 
context. For example, numerous papers have been devoted to ‘paradigm bridging’ (e.g. 
Gioia & Pitre, 1990; Lewis & Grimes, 1999; Schultz & Hatch, 1996; Weaver & Gioia, 
1994). Furthermore, there seems to be an emerging view that theoretical proliferation and 
turnover seem to generate impossible demands on scholars’ ability to keep current in the 
field; threatening our confidence and making it difficult to determine the appropriate 
foundation on which to build research (Elsbach, Sutton & Whetten, 1999; Glynn, Barr & 
Dacin, 2000). Theory development forums have therefore concentrated mainly on 
procedural issues, integrating existing models and searching for a single conceptual 
framework to unify ‘false’ differences between various theories and paradigms. Fabian 
(2000), in the conclusion of an intelligent piece on ‘controversy’ in the management 
discipline, seems to catch a prevailing mood when she suggests:  
…A proliferation of theoretical perspectives without any cohesion leaves researchers unable to 
discern the pragmatic ‘what’s what?’ Theory again turns meaningless when constantly 
contradicted, disparaged, or upstaged by vying theories and paradigms (p.366).   
 
This is not to say that the dominant tendency in OMT is to reject conflict entirely – which 
would be a rather remarkable feat – but rather that the inevitably conflictual process by 
which, through exclusion and subordination, the discipline defines its borders tends to be 
                                                 
4 Of course, this is not distinctive of our field.  Bourdieu (1988) and Culler (1981/2001) make similar 
points regarding their respective fields of sociology and literary theory.   
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denied in the name of an ideal of knowledge and truth that deems these to be conflict-
free, self-identical, and hence, reproducible as such and transmissible to students (cf. 
Weber, 2001).  This theme of unification and ‘correction’ of interpretation is clearly 
demonstrated in the recent debate in this journal on the ‘truth’ about social 
constructionism.  Meckler and Baillie (2003a) present a case for finding a ‘middle way’ 
between what they term ‘objective truth’ and the postmodern rejection of notions of truth, 
by distinguishing “what is correct from what is mistaken in…social construction theses” 
(p. 273).   In his reply Gioia (2003) sets out to clarify what he sees as the common 
misconstrual of social constructionism (by non-interpretive theorists).  Both Gioia’s 
(2003) and Lounsbury’s (2003) replies present strongly worded arguments defending 
social constructionism as a distinct approach, and Meckler and Baillie’s (2003b) final 
reply is no less forceful and personal: “It seems we have struck a raw nerve, sending such 
esteemed scholars as Gioia and Lounsbury howling so furiously at the moon” (p.302).   
 
The significance of heated epistemological and ontological exchanges so typical of the 
‘paradigm wars’ certainly should not be exaggerated when the extent to which they 
actually have informed our research practice is marginal5.  To use Vickers’ (1995) 
terminology: there seems to be a disjunction between the ways in which organizational 
scholars are ready to see and value the organizational world (their appreciative setting – 
which can be often adventurous) and the ways in which they are ready to respond to it 
(their instrumental system – which tends to be rather conservative). Over the years the 
paradigm debate seems to have become the vessel of containment of its original political 
challenge, redefining the place and nature of conflict by placing it within a ‘natural’ 
context. Awkward or divergent perspectives are now all too easily packaged “as part of 
the so-called ‘paradigm wars’ [rather] than as raising questions with which mainstream 
organization theory has to be concerned” (Hinings and Greenwood, 2002, p.416). The 
personalized nature characterizing many of the ‘paradigm’ exchanges merely adds to this 
sense of irrelevance for the wider community.  Both those pleading for 
consensus/integration, and those advocating incommensurability/fragmentation are 
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effectively de-politicizing the field.  Czarniawska (2001, p.19) pithily summarized the 
situation with a nod to Bakhtin’s vocabulary:  
Recently, probably in a wave of turn-of-the-century anxiety, we have witnessed many appeals to 
integration and solidification, accompanied by the fears of fragmentation and a consequent loss of 
legitimacy of organization theory. The alternative claims vouched for chaos and fragmentation, for 
incommensurability and separate word games. While both integration and separation are attractive 
as separate discourses (they both allow one to live in peace and talk only to those who agree), I 
shall insist on the hardship of the paradoxical road in suggesting that talk to the Other we must, 
although we need not agree.   
 
Academics and practitioners: Mode 1, 2, or 1.5? 
Why do so much education and training, management consulting, and business research and so 
many books and articles produce so little change in what managers and organizations actually do? 
(Pfeffer & Sutton, 1999, p.83)   
 
That there is a wide gap between organizational research and managerial practice is 
hardly a new observation (Daft & Lewin, 1990; Jacques, 1992; Starkey & Madan, 2001). 
Findings in scholarly management journals appear, to many, only remotely related to the 
world of practicing managers and as a consequence the perceived impact from the 
research coming from business schools is close to nil (Astley & Zammuto, 1992). Recent 
studies by Boland et al. (2001) and Mohrman et al. (2001) indicated that the typical way 
of presenting academic information (through objective, declarative knowledge) is a 
relatively ineffective way of getting knowledge to ‘take’ in practitioner settings.  
Furthermore, the ‘knowledge gap’ is felt through the frequent experience of managers 
that academic research follows, rather than leads, practice (Rynes, Bartunek & Daft, 
2001).  
 
In response there have been various ‘call to arms’, not least in recent presidential 
addresses at the Academy of Management (Hambrick, 1994; Huff, 2000; Mowday, 1997, 
Van de Ven, 2002).  Hambrick’s (1994, p.12) appeal is typical: 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Martin (1992, p.233), while reflecting on her practice as a researcher, remarked: “Those of us who have 
unconservative political convictions and a commitment to doing empirical organizational research have a 
problem: Empirical research in our field tends to be inherently conservative.” 
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We must recognize that our responsibility is not to ourselves but to the institutions around the 
world that are in dire need of improved management, as well as to those individuals who seek to 
be the most effective managers they possibly can be. 
The sub-text here is that organizational researchers must bridge the many disciplinary and 
ideological islands in the academic community in order to see the whole system that they 
are studying and so be of ‘use’ to a wider constituency6; with usefulness determined by 
whether the research findings are actually being incorporated in organization design 
decisions, and whether action was taken that was informed by the research (cf. Mohrman, 
2001).  
 
The increasing pressure to be less theoretically abstract and more practically relevant for 
private and public management seems to have crystallized in recent years around the 
‘Mode 1’ (discipline-based and theory building) versus ‘Mode 2’ (collaborative and 
problem-focused) discourse, based on Gibbons et al.’s (1994) internationally influential 
research manifesto.  The basic argument of this book is that as traditional disciplinary 
university knowledge (Mode 1) is no longer able to reflect the current complexities of the 
world, knowledge should be increasingly produced by tearing down boundaries between 
disciplines as well as between theory and practice.  Applied to OMT, advocates of a 
Mode 2 perspective would argue that the field should by its very nature be applied, and 
that too many within the closed academic community produce trivial and irrelevant 
knowledge (Tranfield & Starkey, 1998).  Starkey and Madan (2001, p.6), for example, 
offer a bleak picture of organizational research that “if judged guilty of a relevance gap… 
it raises critical issues of role justification and, ultimately, long term survival”.   Others 
gladly have taken up the challenge, arguing that central to the development of useful 
knowledge is the freedom to experiment, to produce useless knowledge that might 
become useful, and to enjoy the freedom from the necessity of ‘relevance’ as a criterion 
of value (Grey, 2001; March, 2000).   
 
In an eerie replication of the ‘paradigm wars,’ major efforts have been undertaken to do a 
little ‘bridging’.  Huff (2000, p.293-294), for example, suggests that “Mode 1.5 is a 
                                                 
6 This has echoes of the English upper class view: “If only the lower orders were to forget their grievances 
and pull together for the good of all, much tedious turmoil could be avoided.” (Eagleton, 1996, p. 19) 
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difficult but desirable position ‘above’ these modes of production…” and “business 
schools… can help drive forward the development of a Mode 1.5 agenda that attempts to 
redress the limitations of knowledge production”.  Even those who favor a move to Mode 
2 approaches acknowledge the dilemma facing the individual choosing between ‘pure’ 
research and practitioner relevance in a context that favors the former with approval and 
reward, and can consider the latter with suspicion (Starkey and Madan, 2001).  Others 
point out that it is far from clear what practitioners actually desire from academic circles 
or what they understand as ‘relevance’.  Pettigrew (2001), for example, suggests that the 
perception of relevance is influenced by the developments of long-term relationships 
between user and academic, and the credibility of academic and institution, the level to 
which the practitioner feels a sense of identification with the research output, and the 
extent to which their own ideas are reaffirmed.  Weick (2001) argues that it is crucial to 
focus not only on the knowledge “producer”, but also the knowledge “consumer”: 
The relevance problem is not just that academics will not set aside their disciplines and begin to 
work in a transdisciplinary manner.  The relevance problem is also that practitioners will not set 
aside their fads and begin to work with fundamentals. (p. S72) 
Thus the conflictual sting is quickly taken out of the dichotomy as the field tries to find a 
consensual position (let’s split the difference, let’s apportion the blame elsewhere), whilst 
those on the margins (the Mode 1 or Mode 2 ‘warriors’) can happily talk amongst 
themselves.   
 
Relations within the community of OMT researchers  
We contend that, as the field has grown and as it has sought scientific legitimacy through adoption 
of many of the trappings of scientific enterprise, it has simultaneously become more rigid, more 
homogeneous, more self-referential, less able to embrace novelty, and hence less able to co-evolve 
with the world to which it is connected. (Bouchikhi & Kimberly, 2001, p.78-79) 
 
A key point… is that empirical evidence about the topic being addressed –  not rhetorical debates 
nor social-political advancement –  provides the answer to how, where, and when to explore and 
exploit OMT knowledge. (Van de Ven, 1999, p.123-124) 
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The belief Van de Ven expresses in the above quote has in recent years proved to be 
rather idealistic.  There is now a growing awareness that we as academics are involved in 
rather messy practice, with its own particular rules and action theories. Power-laden 
mechanisms of production and control (e.g. resource allocations, editorial decisions and 
refereeing procedures) discipline the research process and condition what is to count as 
‘scientific knowledge’ (Calás & Smircich, 1999, Westwood & Clegg, 2003).  Indeed, the 
research process has acquired strong commercial overtones as increasingly the expression 
of knowledge claims becomes economically rewarded apart from its contribution to 
understanding (Deetz, 1995). Bouchikhi and Kimberly (2001) suggest that there is a 
growing disjunction between what many management researchers would really like to do 
in their research and what they feel constrained to do by the existing institutional 
framework. The institutionalization of business education and management research has 
led to the development of procedures, controls and mindsets which effectively act as a 
sort of intellectual straitjacket. Perhaps nowhere is the intellectual straitjacket as obvious 
as in the pressure to publish in elite journals (Clegg, 2002; Pettigrew, 20017).  This has an 
inevitably conservative impact on the priorities and choices of individual researchers.  
Sutton and Staw (1995), for example, discuss how authors’ expositions of their methods 
often bear little resemblance to the actual processes that got them to the final published 
product.  Against this background, Pfeffer’s call to commit “to a set of fundamental 
questions… and working through a set of processes or rules to resolve theoretical 
disputes and debates (Pfeffer, 1993, p.618)” sounds a little shrill.  Inquiry is always-
already restricted by visible and invisible rules, codes and protocols8. 
 
Research that does not conform to the dominant speech genres and styles considered 
worthy of publication has little chance of ever being published. Burrell’s (1996, p.652) 
reflection on how he found it simply impossible to publish an article on Michel Foucault, 
                                                 
7 It is somewhat ironic that these sentiments are being expressed in articles published in elite journals, thus 
increasing the authors’ ‘strike rate’. 
8 One could argue that one only truly has entered a field, not when one has faithfully learned and abides by 
its rules, but when one practices a degree of self-distance and participates in the unwritten rules which tell 
us how and when to violate the explicit rules. It is this distance from the symbolic rules which truly 
confirms our membership. This is why the argument that more codified rules could serve as guidance for 
those entering the field is misleading.  The more one identifies with the explicit rules, the more one is 
condemned to remain an outsider (Žižek, 2002).  
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however pertinent the material to the study of organizations, is one of our favorite 
examples: 
… in 1984, when a piece written on Foucault’s contribution to organizational analysis was 
submitted to ASQ… I treasure its referees’ comments to this day, for all three questioned the 
relevance of ‘an unknown French philosopher’ and asked ‘what could an American audience learn 
from such thought’. My understanding of the importance of the North Atlantic Ocean as a divide 
as well as a communication route was firmly fixed at this moment. 
 
Whilst mildly amusing in retrospect, this quote also crystallizes the difficulties of 
working within a ‘professionalist’ paradigm of knowledge. The regulative idea of this 
paradigm is that of the absolute autonomy of the individual discipline, construed as a 
self-contained body of investigative procedures and of knowledge, subject to its own 
laws (Weber, 2001).  In recent years we have seen even a hardening of disciplinary 
boundaries and an increasing resistance of disciplines to engaging in debate with other 
disciplines (Clegg, 2002; Fuller, 2003)9. The danger is that such self-containment can 
lead to a lack of real engagement with other perspectives, with conflict being explained 
away by “simply asserting that it is contained by - i.e., within – whatever monad (set of 
assumptions, interpretive institution, etc.) is said to occupy the critic” (Weber, 2001, 
p.43)10.  Efforts to encourage active engagement between perspectives face an almost 
institutionalized challenge, with the result often a passive juxtaposition of perspectives, 
rather than real engagement (cf. Westwood & Clegg, 2003), or vitriolic attacks which 
merely serve to deepen the entrenchment of views.   
                                                 
9 To borrow Frost’s words: despite exposure to “expansive oceans of knowledge” organizational scientists 
prefer to stay in their “own comfortable well” (Frost, 2002, p.21).   
10 Interestingly, Samuel Weber wrote these comments back in 1983.  For a review of the book containing a 
collection of his essays (Weber, 2001), see De Cock and Volkmann (2002).   
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A brief encounter with Bakhtin 
 
To bring Bakhtin to bear is to risk seeming to rehearse the tired gesture by which the Soviet 
theorist is burdened with the credit for having, either single-handedly or with a little help from his 
friends, anticipated and surpassed the most significant theoretical trends of recent decades. 
(Shepherd, 2001, p.136) 
 
We have explored so far the manifold ways in which recent controversies in our 
discipline revolve around the issues of consensus, conflict and diversity (be it in the form 
of a yearning for a one-best-way-of-proceeding or, alternatively, as a denouncement of 
the intellectual straitjacket an institutionalized field imposes).  In this context it is 
somewhat surprising that so little effort has been devoted to exploring the work of 
thinkers who have put the issue of conflict and diversity at the core of their intellectual 
projects.  No one was more pre-occupied with the issues of conflict and diversity 
(particularly in relation to discourse) than the Russian literary theorist and philosopher 
Mikhail Bakhtin and it is to him we turn next.  With Bakhtin we will take a firm step 
away from the market view of language (which we believe still underpins many OMT 
discourses) where meaning can belong to us like a commodity, and language is just a set 
of tokens which, like money, allow us to exchange our meaning-commodity.  In 
Bakhtin’s view language has a relative autonomy; an existence of its own in which 
human beings come to participate, and only by participating in it do they come to be 
human at all.  Yet, language is also always caught up in definite social relationships, and 
these social relationships are in turn part of broader political, ideological and economic 
systems. 
 
Whilst it is easy to deploy such characteristically Bakhtinian terms such as heteroglossia, 
dialogism, the carnival, or chronotope; such efforts often only serve as incantations to 
dignify already existing analytical habits that have not been affected by Bakhtin’s thought 
in any meaningful way (Poole, 2001).  It is worth pointing out at the start of our 
‘encounter’, that in his several attempts to find a single name for diversity, such as 
heteroglossia or polyphony, Bakhtin was at pains never to stifle the energizing role of the 
paradox and conflict at the heart of his enterprise.  We therefore turn to Bakhtin, not to 
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borrow some meta-framework, but because we believe we can enrich our thinking about 
diversity and conflict by connecting with his. 
 
Throughout his various writings Bakhtin charts an epic struggle over time between the 
forces of centralization, which he also called the centripetal forces of sociolinguistic life, 
and the centrifugal forces of heteroglossia.  Thus there exists a contradiction-ridden, 
tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language.  Bakhtin, who 
always opposed language becoming mechanical or authoritative, was an astute student of 
his own time and place, marking, for example, Pravda editorials with colored pens to 
bring out the hidden meanings behind the different levels of discourse (Clark & Holquist, 
1984).  Bakhtin’s goal was to overcome simplified linear thinking by introducing a 
multiplicity of perspectives. This meant, above all, an emphatic rejection of dogmatism 
(Shotter & Billig, 1998). Heteroglossia, or the mingling of different language groups, 
cultures, and classes, was for Bakhtin the ideal condition, guaranteeing a perpetual 
linguistic and intellectual revolution which guards against the hegemony of any ‘official’ 
language in a given society, against ossification and stagnation in thought.  Language was 
to be seen as inherently ‘dialogic’: it could be grasped only in terms of its inevitable 
orientation towards another.  However, we should not conflate Bakhtin’s position with 
fashionable liberal-multiculturalist notions of diversity which talk about creating a neutral 
space in which a multitude of narratives can coexist peacefully.  Notions of conflict and 
struggle very much underpin Bakhtin’s conception of language11. Language is not to be 
seen as ‘expression’ or ‘reflection’ but rather a material social practice where meaning is 
the outcome of a process of social conflict and dialogue.   
 
Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism was most comprehensively formulated in his book on 
Dostoevsky as a theory of the novel (Bakhtin, 1984)12, though its implications extend 
                                                 
11 As Eagleton (1996, p.102) put it, for Bakhtin “the sign was to be seen less as a fixed unit (like a signal) 
than as an active component of speech, modified and transformed in meaning by the variable social tones, 
valuations and connotations it condensed within itself in specific social conditions. Since such valuations 
and connotations were constantly shifting, since the ‘linguistic community’ was in fact a heterogeneous 
society composed of many conflicting interests, the sign for Bakhtin was less a neutral element in a given 
structure than a focus of struggle and contradiction.”   
12 Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics was the first book that appeared under Bakhtin’s own name and was 
published in 1929.  It was also his last appearance in print before disappearing into exile and obscurity.  
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beyond the world of literary study.  Dostoevsky interests Bakhtin because he juxtaposes 
points of view that are never subordinated to any single or monological perspective: his 
characters are the bearers of different truths; their voices embody different ethical 
positions which are tested in the course of a novel and there is a continuous renegotiation 
of opinion. The discussion of Dostoevsky allows Bakhtin to attack the conventional idea 
that authors are able to manifest their intentions completely in their works, so that readers 
can know precisely ‘what they meant’.  The author is only to be thought of as located in a 
network of relations and speech genres and is not a point of origin for these things 
(Burkitt, 1998). It is a drastic step away from the theory of authorship (and 
communication) represented by Saussure’s drawing of the two talking heads, who send 
out messages to each other that monologically embody their intentions. 
 
Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism is based upon a deeply relational understanding of 
language. With Bakhtin we see a move from ‘language’ (speech or writing viewed 
objectively as a chain of signs without a subject) to ‘discourse’ (language grasped as 
utterance, as involving speaking and writing subjects and therefore also readers or 
listeners).  Discourse, or ‘Speech’ as Bakhtin (1986) uses the term, covers many of the 
aspects of Saussure’s parole, for it is concerned with what happens when real people, in 
all the contingency of their myriad lives, actually speak to each other. But Saussure 
conceived of the individual language user to be an absolutely free agent with the ability 
to choose any words to implement a particular intention. Saussure concluded, not 
surprisingly, that language as used by heterogeneous millions of such willful subjects was 
unstudiable.  Bakhtin, on the other hand, begins by assuming that individual speakers do 
not have the kind of freedom parole assumes they have. The basic unit for the study of 
actual speech practice is the “utterance” which, “with all its individuality and creativity, 
can in no way be regarded as a completely free combination of forms of language, as is 
supposed, for example, by Saussure” (Bakhtin, 1986, p.82).  For Bakhtin it is not simply 
a matter of asking “what the utterance meant”, but of investigating its varied history, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
The second edition of 1963 heralded his re-emergence onto the Soviet publishing scene and his rise to 
international prominence (see Clark & Holquist, 1984, p.238ff). 
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conflicting social groups, classes, individuals and discourses seek to appropriate it and 
imbue it with their own meanings.    
 
The key point to make here is that for Bakhtin there are no ‘neutral’ words and forms. 
Not only are words and sentences always-already there, but so are the forms for their 
combination into utterances.  There is no language which is not caught up in definite 
social relationships, and these relationships are in turn part of broader political, 
ideological and economic systems.  Words are multi-accentual rather than frozen in 
meaning.   
As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing… language… lies on the borderline between oneself 
and the other.  The word in language is half someone else’s.  It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when 
the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, 
adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention… Language… is populated – 
overpopulated – with the intentions of others. (Bakhtin, 1981, p.293-294) 
Thus we are never free to impose our unobstructed intention but must always mediate 
that intention through the intentions of others, beginning with the otherness of the 
language itself in which we speak: we must enter into a dialogue with others. Language 
must belong to the Other – to my linguistic community as a whole – before it can belong 
to me, so that the self comes to its unique articulation in a medium which is always at 
some level indifferent to it. This does not mean that we cannot make our own point of 
view understood; it simply implies that our point of view will only emerge through the 
interaction of our own and others’ words as they contend with each other in particular 
situations.  Our speech, that is, all our utterances (including creative works), is filled with 
others’ words, with varying degrees of otherness and varying degrees of ‘our-own-ness’. 
These words of others carry with them their own expression which we always assimilate, 
rework, and re-accentuate. Our own writing exemplifies the struggle to appropriate 
others’ words in that we have made use of an inordinate amount of direct quotes (thus 
accentuating a degree of otherness) while (hopefully) preserving the readability and 
purpose of this text13.  In the final sections of our paper we will connect Bakhtin’s 
thinking with various issues in OMT we outlined earlier. 
                                                 
13 Juxtaposed, quotations take on novel meanings and enter into mutual debate (Steiner, 2001). Walter 
Benjamin (1999) is a prime example of an eminent intellectual who was obsessed with quotations.  He 
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 Back to OMT: Positions of enunciation 
Nobody is especially concerned about what you say, with what extreme, moderate, radical or 
conservative positions you adopt, provided that they are compatible with, and can be articulated 
within, a specific form of discourse. It is just that certain meanings and positions will not be 
articulable within it… Regional dialects of the discourse, so to speak, are acknowledged and 
sometimes tolerated, but you must not sound as though you are speaking another language 
altogether.  To do so is to recognize in the sharpest way that critical discourse is power.  To be on 
the inside of the discourse itself is to be blind to this power, for what is more natural and non-
dominative than to speak one’s own tongue?  (Eagleton, 1996, p.177) 
 
Bakhtin’s deeply relational view of language suggests that our position of enunciation 
(the subjective position from where we speak) is of great importance in determining what 
we say and how we are heard. There are no words and forms that can belong to ‘no one’ 
and every utterance must be regarded primarily as a response to preceding utterances of a 
given sphere of speech communication. As Bourdieu (1992, p.47) suggested:  
One does not say the same thing in epistemology no matter what the time or place.  One develops 
more or less this or that principle of epistemology according to the state of the unconscious in the 
given society.  For example, in a society dominated by positivism, it is necessary to accentuate 
constructivism.  To put this another way, epistemology is a politics of science (emphasis added). 
Whilst, for example, the paradigm debate initially brought a genuine political dimension 
to the field of OMT, we suggest it now has acquired a rather tired quality as 
epistemological positions have shifted14.  Perhaps we should not prolong this particular 
debate but find new ways of revitalizing and politicizing the field by tapping into or 
creating new discourses?   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
regarded quotations in his work as “wayside robbers who leap out, armed, and relieve the idle stroller of his 
convictions” (p.481). Benjamin understood his first book, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, as 
essentially a book of quotations with his own writing as secondary and is reported as saying he wanted to 
write a book with nothing but quotations (Steiner’s comment emphasizes the sheer scale of such a project: 
“Walter Benjamin dreamt of publishing a book composed entirely of quotations. I lack the necessary 
originality…” p.13). 
14 We refer here, for example, to Elsbach et al. (1999, p.633) who posited: “In 1989, the notion that there is 
no objective means of assessing the value of a theory would have been viewed as heresy in many of the 
same corners that it is now accepted as given truth, or at least a plausible and troubling possibility.” 
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If we push this line of thinking a little further, we can consider the truth-value of a 
proposition as a matter of its social function.  What is enunciated is collapsible to the 
conditions of enunciation: what matters is not so much what is said, but who says it to 
whom, from which position (with what, possibly implicit, authority), for what purposes. 
At the very least we should be aware of the properly symbolic domain of communication 
in which language is used as a rhetorical device, with its referential meaning clearly 
subordinated to its performative dimension (of seduction, coercion, etc.). It matters 
greatly if something is said by the president of the Academy of Management or by a 
distinguished scholar (e.g., Karl Weick in the field of OMT, Pierre Bourdieu in the field 
of sociology); arguments suddenly carry more weight if they are published in ASQ, AMR 
or AMJ. To give some examples: Would there have been such a vigorous debate, 
described as ‘paradigm wars’, if anyone of less stature than Jeffrey Pfeffer and John Van 
Maanen had offered their views on diversity in organization studies?15 (Indeed, would 
anyone else but John Van Maanen have been able to publish such a histrionic response to 
Jeffrey Pfeffer?)  Furthermore, does the reflexive, de-mystifying, stance of eminent 
scholars which seems to be de rigueur today (cf. Hardy, Phillips & Clegg, 2001; Weick, 
1999) not presuppose a rather elevated a position of enunciation from which these 
scholars can afford such a deprecating self-designation16?  Finally, when we academics, 
in a supposedly critical self-reflection, admit to and deplore the ‘disconnects’ between 
management research and managers, is the admission of our ‘guilt’ not the way to 
preserve our subjective position intact, free from responsibility. In short, there is a way to 
avoid responsibility by, precisely, too readily assuming one’s ‘guilt’ in an exaggerated 
way (cf. Žižek, 2000). 
 
 
                                                 
15 It is not as if the content of Pfeffer’s article was that provocative.  He eloquently worded, and thus 
brought into explicitly codified existence, a tacit uneasiness among mainly American scholars about recent 
developments in the field.  Furthermore, whilst Van Maanen’s response got quoted extensively in AMR 
(e.g. see  Fabian’s (2000) review), it is interesting to note that it was published in the Crossroads section of 
Organization Science and not in AMR where Pfeffer’s article was published. 
16 Would it be advisable for a young management scholar to describe himself or herself in a job interview 
as “a practitioner who works with abstract words for a living, reads a lot, and would like to get better at 
crafting images that capture what I think organizing is all about” (Weick, 1999, p.798)?  Our own 
experience suggests that however honest and de-mystifying this deportment might be, it would be a rather 
foolhardy stance to adopt for the young scholar in question.  
 17
For a return of the political  
Pluralism allows for a multiplicity of coexisting, even competing interpretations, opinions, or 
approaches; what it does not allow is for the space in which these interpretations are held to take 
place to be itself considered conflictual...  ‘Scholarship’ and ‘research’ may investigate conflict, 
but they do not – or must not – as such partake of it. The function of ‘pluralism’ is precisely to 
deny the necessity of conflict, in the name of peacefully coexisting diversity. (Weber, 2001, p.42) 
 
Whilst the problem-solution model of OMT has led to enlightening insights, one should 
nonetheless insist that the procedures of posing problems and finding solutions to them 
always and by definition occur within a certain ideological context that determines which 
problems are crucial and which solutions acceptable.  The issue of whom we should be 
responsible to and in what way can never be assumed as being ‘beyond question’.  
Rather, answers to these questions are continuously up for negotiation and are crucially 
bound up with the identity of the field of organization studies itself (Deetz, 2001). The 
very fact of joining the Mode 1/Mode 2 discursive universe means entering a socio-
ideological dimension we have to struggle with if we are not to blindly follow a particular 
political agenda.  Consider this extract from Gibbons et al. (1994, p.111): “Another 
important precondition is to have access to such knowledge and expertise, being able to 
reconfigure it in novel ways and offer it for sale” (emphasis added).  Don’t we already 
have here a conceptualization of knowledge “that is embedded in particular socio-
technical relations of capital and geared towards the production of surplus value”, as 
Böhm (2002, p.333) points out?  Don’t we assume here that “it is the knowledge 
commodity that should be produced at universities as efficiently and effectively as 
possible” (ibid.)?  The return to the political we advocate means that OMT should not be 
seen as an independent realm of thought and knowledge, but as a practice that is fully 
embedded in the wider social relations of capitalist production.  Rather than focusing on 
how academic papers might include implications for practice and/or policy, it requires 
thinking about ways that academics might become directly involved in policy 
development processes (Bartunek, 2002). It is an antithetical response to the “obsession 
with consensus and convergence” Hardy (2002) identified in our field.  If we accept that 
knowledge production can no longer be seen as a result of a neutral, anonymous process 
but occurs in a politically charged, socio-cultural context of real people with real agendas 
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working within important personal relationships and institutional ties (Calás & Smircich, 
1999), then surely it would follow that our field has a strong conflictual dimension.  The 
fact that it has not indicates that a powerful ideological agenda has carried the day, 
without too many people noticing (or caring).  Trying to resolve conflicting viewpoints 
into a consensus implies a refusal of the truth that some conflicts can be resolved on one 
side alone.  Indeed, the demands that “things should soon return to normal,” that we 
should just “get on with the job of finding empirical evidence,” not creating “echo 
chambers that lead to nowhere,” have a profound de-politicizing effect.  They presuppose 
a view of our field as a corporate body, a homogenous social space, and social divisions 
are like illnesses we should fight.  Conflict is seen as destructive and can be avoided by 
formulating clear rules to be obeyed.  But this procedural formalism has the effect of 
trivializing the actual content of passionately held positions. Thus we find ourselves in 
agreement with Hinings and Greenwood (2002) when they suggest that the disconnection 
of organizational studies from its core disciplines (primarily sociology) and its transition 
to business schools has left many important sociological questions (such as inequality, 
power and ideology) in perpetual neglect.  It has set us on 
 … a path on which the social practice of science as something that involves politics becomes 
minimized by a singular focus on efficiency and effectiveness. And rather than this being the 
intended consequence of some grand strategy, it is far more feasible to see this as an unanticipated 
outcome of the normalization of organization theory within the disciplinary rituals of those 
institutions that host it ... after all, so much of power involves efficient drilling of routines into a 
level of subconsciousness where issues of responsibility will not intrude. (Clegg, 2002, p.437) 
 
Our plea for a return of the political and an explicit recognition of struggle in OMT does 
also imply a rejection of cozy pluralism, which can spring from there nothing being much 
at stake in the first place. A political struggle proper is never simply a rational debate 
between multiple interests but, simultaneously, the struggle for one’s voice to be heard 
and recognized as that of a legitimate partner in the mainstream of the field.  A 
conflictual perspective by definition requires some kind of connection with others’ 
meanings.  To quote Eagleton (1991, p.13): “Those who quite properly emphasize that 
language is a terrain of conflict sometimes forget that conflict presupposes a degree of 
mutual agreement: we are not politically conflicting if you hold that patriarchy is an 
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objectionable social system and I hold that it is a small town in upper New York state.” 
We do not see zero-sum conflict as necessarily destructive.  There are a range of 
important contentions (about the nature of research, relations within and between 
fields…) someone is going to have to win and someone else to lose.  Equalizing of all 
viewpoints can mask a callous indifference. In sketching a vision of a ‘dialogical’ field, 
we could do worse than appropriating Deetz’s (2001) words:  
The conflictual field out of which objects are formed is recovered for creative redetermination – 
constant dedifferentiation and redifferentiation.  Given the power of common sense and 
organizational routines, such rereads require rigor and imagination.  The rereadings are formed out 
of a keen sense of irony, a serious playfulness, and are often guided by the pleasure one has in 
being freed from the dull compulsions of a world made too easy and too constraining. The point of 
research in this sense is not to get it right but to challenge the guiding assumptions, fixed 
meanings and relations, and reopen the formative capacity of human beings in relation to others 
and the world… (p. 37) 
 
Thus contradiction is to be fully accepted and worked through, something we would 
prefer to omit in our rush for consistency.  Even if a field is permeated by conflict (as, for 
example, in contradictory theories that try to make sense of a particular phenomenon), 
this does in no way preclude dialogue between interlocutors – various meanings “all may 
be juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another 
and co-exist in the consciousness of real people…” (Bakhtin,1981, p. 292)17.  Does this 
incoherence create confusion?  Yes!  Does this create the impression that the field of 
organization studies is unclear about what knowledge it is passing on?  Yes!  There are 
many who would see this as a serious problem. For example, Van de Ven (1999, p.120-
121), has a fictional student say:  
The classes were echo chambers between contingency theory, resource dependence theory, 
resource-based theory, institutional theory, transactions costs theory, agency theory, network 
theory, organizational ecology theory, and complexity theories… You exposed me to all these 
                                                 
17 We would argue that it is precisely the willingness to engage with others’ positions that ultimately proves 
the strength of one’s own position.  Eco (1992, p.150-151) put it succinctly: “The force of the Copernican 
revolution is not only due to the fact that it explains some astronomical phenomena better than the 
Ptolemaic tradition, but also to the fact that it – instead of resenting Ptolemy as a crazy liar – explains why 
and on which grounds he was justified in outlining his own interpretation.” 
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theories but gave me no way to sift and winnow among them. How do I know which view is better 
or worse than another? 
Yet, is transparency necessarily a good? Perhaps in communicating our research and 
teaching our students, sometimes it is good to leave our audience puzzled, uncertain 
about what is being said, even confused.  This is where the real thinking may start.  The 
most corrupting of comforts is intellectual comfort.  We see the act of becoming a scholar 
as one of progressively mastering the field’s (possibly contradictory) speech genres.  To 
paraphrase Geertz (as quoted in Horgan, 1997, p.154): progress in OMT may be a 
corollary of the precision which we vex each other and perpetuate debate in evermore 
interesting ways.  Of course, there is always the danger that such a process will lead not 
to fruitful dialogue, but to ever more defensiveness, obscurantism, hostility and 
avoidance (Case, 2003).  This is often characterized in the field by one side attacking a 
‘straw man’ set up to represent another side, enabling easy victories but, at the same time, 
reflecting ignorance on the part of the protagonist (Westwood & Clegg, 2003).  Yet 
dialogue is essential, and it is an art we need to rediscover. Such a dialogical perspective 
would offer not just a challenge to orthodoxy (after all, what is orthodox?) but a 
challenge to the exclusivity of all authorities.   
 
As dialogue is essentially interminable, it leaves us as authors of this text in a somewhat 
awkward position as we must solve the riddle: How to ‘conclude’ (thus complying with a 
generic expectation of closure in our field) without offering a conclusion?  Weber’s 
(2001) notion of ‘curious’ conclusions – “curious… because, in a certain sense, they do 
not conclude. They should not so much satisfy curiosity as suscitate it” (p.72) – 
encouraged us to let another voice provide our postscript, appropriately enough in a piece 
where we have appropriated so many words.   
Too often pluralism leads to a dull consensus or becomes an instrument for the denial of the 
claims of others. By contrast, paralogy18 implies the refusal of such closure, and the perpetual 
opening of spaces of contestation. Which is to say that without the critical functioning of theory in 
the name of a forever open future, we have nothing but repetition, which for many is total silence. 
Jones (2003, p. 521) 
                                                 
18 Jones (2003) adopts Lyotard’s definition of paralogy as “the search for instabilities” (1984, 53ff.) 
producing “not the known, but the unknown” (1984 p.60) taken from The Postmodern Condition: A report 
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